What to expect when no one's expecting: America's coming demographic disaster

By Jonathan Last. New York: Encounter Books, 2013.

Reviewed by Petrus Simons PhD

Introduction

The world’s population has increased from 3 billion in 1960 to 7 billion by the end of 2011, with 9 or 10 billion expected by 2050. Given that about 1 billion suffer hunger or malnutrition, many believe that the world is over-populated. In contrast, Jonathan Last argues that we should rather worry about a declining birth rate, which in due course will result in a decreasing world population. The populations of Russia, Italy, Japan and Latvia are already declining.

The statistic used is the total fertility rate, defined as the number of live births that women will have during their life, assuming they experience the age-specific fertility rates of a given period. At a rate of 2.1 a population will replace itself. At a lower rate, it will contract. In 1979 the world’s fertility rate was 6.0. It is now 2.52, close to replacement. New Zealand’s rate is around 2.0.

This review will summarise Last’s arguments and then discuss their strengths and weaknesses.

Reasons for falling fertility

Last is concerned with trends and cautions against possible biases such as racism or criticising women for not producing more babies. His reasons for the declining trend can be summed up as follows.

Religion and Secularisation: The waning of the Christian religion, which has always emphasised the blessing of children, has led not only to falling birth rates, but also to easier divorce, higher rates of divorce, declining numbers of marriages, greater acceptance of homo-sexuality and an increase in abortions.

Secularisation is associated with a belief that individuals are autonomous and should decide for themselves how they live. As a result the value of ‘community’ has been declining.

Medical: Better health care has led to a decline in infant mortality and, consequently, has eliminated the need to replace those dying in infancy. Progress in medical technology has also brought new methods of birth control. Sadly, it has also facilitated abortions. Since the US Supreme Court legalised abortion in 1973 (Roe vs Wade), there have been 49.5 million abortions. Currently, in Russia 13 abortions are performed for every 10 live-births. Last notes that “this might be the most grisly statistic the world has ever seen. It suggests a society that no longer has the will to live.” (p.137)

Modern culture: Women, particularly those who are more highly educated and are pursuing a career or trying to earn extra income, have less time to nurture families. Unemployment, lower incomes for many, rising costs of transport and housing, urbanisation and smaller houses, and high costs of child care (including baby car seats, prams etc) are all conspiring to reduce the birth rate. In addition, the availability of social welfare schemes, especially superannuation, has lessened the need to have children who can look after elderly parents.   

A historic shift: Historically, elites have had higher numbers of children than the poor. In Europe this began to change with the advent of the Industrial Revolution at the end of the 18th century. Since then the rich have been reducing the number of their offspring more severely than the poor. This reversal has been repeated just about everywhere. The lower classes follow by having fewer babies as well, so that they too can climb the social ladder. In other words, “reproduction has become an impediment to material success.” (p.74) In the United States, more college graduates with higher mobility means that people are congregating together with those who share their interests and values. As a result, “changes in fertility have altered the fundamental dynamics of American politics.” (p. 130)

Problems

The shift from growing to eventually declining populations entails a variety of problems.

Youth bulges:In some countries births have fallen so suddenly that there exists a bulge of young people. Had the decline happened more gradually, there would have been a number of generations with above-replacement, albeit decreasing, levels of births. Iran is a recent example. It has a ‘surplus’ of young men, who compete for jobs and who might easily be recruited for revolutionary campaigns.

One child policy: In China, the one-child policy that was initiated in the 1980s could lead to shortages of labour as well as pension problems after 2050. Since the policy has encouraged abortions, especially of girls, there is a growing oversupply of young men.

Japan:Japan is probably the country with the most drastic fall in live births since it became the first country to legalise abortion under its “Eugenic Protection Law” after the Second World War. It has also witnessed a decline in marriage and a consequent fall in births. Marriages also end much more frequently in divorce. By 2100, if the present fertility rate continues, the population could fall from 127 million to 91 million.

Redundant infrastructure and economic costs:In Germany, empty houses and shops are making way for parks. Obstetric clinics are turned into nursing homes. In North Rhine-Westphalia the government has retrained prostitutes to become elder-care nurses. In Japan, a depopulated village was turned into a landfill.    

In general, Last identifies the following effects:

  1. A sharp rise in the costs of health care.
  2. Smaller groups of younger people to bear the costs of old age (pensions and health).
  3. A slower pace of human progress due to a declining level of entrepreneurship and inventiveness. (Older people are more risk averse and lack the vigour to invent new things.)
  4. Older societies are less prepared to engage in war or to accept casualties.

Second demographic transition

Not everybody is convinced that falling fertility is a problem.  Demographers Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk J. van de Kaa believe that low fertility is the result of modernity itself, another stage in our evolution and, therefore, a good thing. They refer to current developments as the second demographic transition, as the first one occurred at the end of the 18th century when the rate of mortality began to decline. Such a transition is complete when the fertility rate reaches the replacement rate. The US and Europe reached this point around 1960. The rest of the world is still in the process of this transition. With fewer children being born, they become very precious, with parents spending more time and effort on them.

What can be done?

Last does not subscribe to the theory that we should not worry about falling fertility. He believes that the trend can be reversed, although not by policies of providing financial incentives and propaganda, which seldom work. So, what does he suggest?

Last’s recommendations are based on three empirically based premises:

  1. Countries do not return to replacement level once their total fertility rate has fallen below 1.5.
  2. Any efforts to stoke fertility must be sustained over several generational cohorts i.e. a decades-long commitment to family growth.
  3. People cannot be bribed into having babies.

Last favours policies that help people have the children they do want. He advocates that the US should reduce the social security tax for those who become parents. He also argues that the costs of sending children to university are far too high and that reform in this area is desirable. Telecommuting might enable families to live near existing social and family networks.

Finally he quotes from Pope Benedict XVI: “Children, our future, are perceived as a threat to the present, as if they were taking something away from our lives. Children are seen as a liability rather than as a source of hope.” (p.175) Importantly, he concludes, Government should welcome believers rather than being hostile to them.

Analysis and Conclusion:

Last provides an admirable review of a world-wide trend of falling fertility, with a comprehensive account of its causes and possible consequences. I believe he is right in emphasising that societies with shrinking populations are less dynamic, and, therefore, face a shrinking tax base, insufficient to meet the demands of both the elderly and the young. Some of these effects are already apparent in countries that have been experiencing declining populations.

It is sobering to note the decline of the Judeo-Christian religion in our modern world as a key factor. In this respect, his account of a reversal of the falling trend in Georgia, in response to a call by the Orthodox Patriarch, is encouraging.  

Last does not address the problem of an increasing number of men suffering from a low sperm count. Although it is possible to overcome this to an extent by IVF, it contributes nevertheless to falling fertility.  

His view that the trend towards falling populations will have dire consequences for the welfare state is much exaggerated. Higher expenditures on the elderly due to an ageing population will be offset by lower expenditures on the young. Since the trend is long-term, policies can easily be adjusted.

Last does not discuss whether the world is able to care adequately for a population of, say, around 9/10 billion, assuming that it would stabilise at this level. Would there be sufficient clean water, proper food and clear air for all?

I would argue that the current ideology of exponential economic growth based upon science and technology stands in the way. Our technical-economic system destroys and pollutes fertile land, warms the climate, produces food that is less and less nutritious, creates stressful jobs and makes many people unemployed. The baby-robots made in Japan to get women interested in real babies symbolise our technologised civilisation. Is our culture committing suicide?  

Yet, change is possible as shown by Georgia’s Patriarch Ilia II’s actions to reverse a fertility collapse. His “mass baptisms are now a staple of Georgian life.” (159) It is a country in which the Christian religion still holds an important place.    

Last has issued a warning that the trend of falling fertility is not a healthy one. His warning is addressed especially to the United States. This may explain why his style is rather colloquial. Had he generalised his story he could have dealt an even greater blow to the myth of the world becoming over-populated.   

Dr Petrus Simons is a retired economist with a PhD in philosophy. He is a contributor to the South African journal "Koers".