Fairness

By Grey Coyle

Fairness is something we quite easily recognise when we see it, but often have great difficulty describing and even more difficulty defining. Children seem to have an intrinsic sense of what is fair and what is not fair but often lack the skill to decide how they would make something fair. Similarly, adults can spot something they believe to be unfair, but analysing why something is fair or unfair from differing perspectives can be difficult.

Fairness and unfairness often concern the allocation of resources within a country, a community or to an individual person. The fair allocation of healthcare resources is a particularly contentious issue. The many questions we might pose about fairness are underpinned by genuinely held and interrelated pragmatic, moral, social and political beliefs. If these beliefs and values were to be developed into conversations about what allocations are fair they would generate many differing opinions.

Within the Christian faith tradition, the evangelist Matthew highlights insights Jesus had about fairness in the parable of the workers in the vineyard (20:1-7). This parable provides a fascinating theological challenge to our understandings of fairness.

Perfect fairness may well be unattainable, but there is increasingly disagreement about what constitutes acceptable levels of fairness in today's political and social landscape. For example, while many social commentators imply there is a high level of unfairness about homeless families living in cars, whatever the aetiological factors of their distress, the spectre of children suffering without a home is not regarded as particularly unjust or unfair by others.

In the story the vineyard owner hires labourers for the day, promising to pay them a denarius. At the third hour, the owner approaches another group who are waiting in the market place because no one has hired them, and also offers them work, saying that they would receive whatever was right; more workers are hired at the sixth and ninth hours and again at the eleventh hour. When evening comes, the vineyard owner gives each worker a denarius. Those who had worked all day protest that they are paid the same as those who had worked only one hour. But the owner responds: "Friend, I am doing you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a denarius? Take what belongs to you and go. I choose to give to this last worker as I give to you. Am I not allowed to do what I choose with what belongs to me? Or do you begrudge my generosity? So the last will be first, and the first last."

At first glance, it seems easy to spot the gross unfairness in the relative rates of pay for hours worked. It is understandable that the workers who have worked the whole day under trying conditions might feel aggrieved that those who have worked only an hour will be remunerated the same. However, in paying them all the same, the owner introduces a quotient of mercy and grace in the wages rather than a quotient of injustice. In this way Jesus' account of divine fairness demonstrates keeping his word and being true to His covenants as well as having a heart for the poor and downtrodden. Perhaps God is also showing his love by creating an opportunity for those who worked the longest hours for their one denarius to experience the grace of accepting the condition of others less well off than themselves.

Various secular justice theories also attempt to explore fairness and how it impacts on our lives. New Zealand has a particular and somewhat unique history in this regard. Analysis of our social and political past shows New Zealanders have traditionally had a strong sense of a fair society.

Specifically, the social reform of the 30's was based on a 'fair go for all'. Robin Gauld1 describes The Social Security Act (1938) as the political and legislative foundation for social welfare in New Zealand. This legislation placed New Zealand's concern for the least well off firmly on a fairness platform which shaped for some time our perception of how subsequent governments acted. However, since the neoliberal economic reforms of the 1980's, and in particular the Global Financial Crisis, the fall-back position on fairness more commonly expressed now is "well I accept something may be unfair, but we have limited resources and who says the world is fair anyway?" It seems, in other words, that fairness has become an unreachable and unnecessary goal; the altruistic goals of 1930's have given way to the individualistic view "what is in my best interests?"

Perfect fairness may well be unattainable, but there is increasingly disagreement about what constitutes acceptable levels of fairness in today's political and social landscape. For example, while many social commentators imply there is a high level of unfairness about homeless families living in cars, whatever the aetiological factors of their distress, the spectre of children suffering without a home is not regarded as particularly unjust or unfair by others.

Justice inevitably involves the moral authority of laws. Homer described justice as personal vengeance. Plato saw justice as both the right of the stronger and the effective harmony of the whole of society. St. Thomas Aquinas believed justice to be divine, directing humankind to do what we feel we ought to do under divine direction. Aristotle, meanwhile, described the formal criterion of justice in terms of treating equals equally and treating unequals unequally and in proportion to that inequality, a definition which still wins wide acceptance today. Aristotle's approach means that where inequality exists such inequality should be addressed by taking from the advantaged and giving to the disadvantaged.

Common to all these positions is an understanding that justice is a positive thing which is applied to decisions, procedures, laws, actions and events2. Lamont3 identifies the main foundational theories of justice as being: strict egalitarianism; resourcedbased principles; welfare-based principles; libertarian principles; and feminist principles. Strict egalitarianism is based on the Aristotelian principle of substantive equality, that all people should have the same level of goods and services. This is justified because it is equality of goods and services that gives practical effect to the respect owed to all equally. However, the principle of strict equality raises the problem of an index of fairness. How do we know which level of goods and services should be fairly distributed?

This question is the basis of the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant which asserts that people are always to be treated not as a means to an end, but as ends in themselves4. Meanwhile Jeremy Bentham, recognised as the founder of utilitarianism, proposed maximising pleasure and minimising pain as a key guiding moral principle for all in society. In determining whether an action is right, however, Bentham argued that it is not just individual happiness or self-interest that counts but delivering the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people. John Stuart Mill, also a utilitarian, warned, however, that the greatest happiness must not involve coercion because this would breach the harm principle, whether the coercion was in the best interests of the person, or not.

Under the Catholic principle of ‘participation’ all people have a right and a duty to participate in society, seeking the wellbeing of all, especially the poor and vulnerable. The notion of the ‘common good’ asserts unfettered rights for all but not at the expense of others, but nor are individual rights to be subordinated to the needs of the group.

Across the wide range of substantial ethical theories and principles of justice as fairness, no one theory commands universal acceptance5. However, in New Zealand a “Fair go” and “Do to others as you would have them do to you” (Luke 6:31) are maxims which would arguably find general acceptance in our part of the world.

While perfect equality may be unattainable, Wilkinson and Pickett6 have demonstrated that very high levels of unfair allocation of resources (particularly income) are directly linked to social pathology for both the most disadvantaged and the most advantaged. In other words, inequality is correlated with negative morbidity and mortality rates, obesity, teenage birth rates, mental illness, homicide, low trust, low social capital, hostility, and racism. Wilkinson and Pickett’s theory links individual’s relative positions in society to deep-seated social problems associated with poverty, poor formal education, relative deprivation and low social status. They also make the claim that communities with high income inequality lack cohesion, exhibit poor social relationships and are bedevilled by mistrust. From this it follows that, in circumstances where the aetiologies ultimately lie in the underlying inequality, ever higher levels of access to social services will make no difference to poor social outcomes. It should be noted that there have been criticisms of Wilkinson and Picketts’ analysis, based on a competing claim that income inequality has no impact on levels of life satisfaction. This illustrates how perceptions of fairness of income inequality is underpinned by particular values and morals.

The moral question I pose is how much fairness or equality is too much to aim for? How much is not enough? Hamilton7 suggests that there must be minimal granting of special privileges to favoured individuals while ensuring those who require assistance are not abandoned. Balancing the scales of fairness appeals to the principles of justice in this dilemma.

John Rawls in A Theory of Justice8 and Amartya Sen in The Idea of Justice9 together present a contemporary far reaching example of what is essential for an understanding of justice as fairness. While theirs is not the only description of justice as fairness, and despite their many critics, Rawls and Sen have provided a substantial framework for determining fairness.

Rawls’ definition of fairness contends that, in liberal democratic societies, fairness should ensure each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a similar liberty of others. Where social and economic distributions are to be unequal, they should be arranged so that distributions are of the greatest benefit for the least advantaged. Rawls and Sen also believe that if fairness is to be achieved, decisions about distributions of goods and services should be made in a manner that is open and accountable and without secrecy.

The Rawls principle leads us to consider whether allocations of resources would be considered fair by the most advantaged people in society if, at an instant, they became the most disadvantaged and required the distribution for themselves. In so doing we are urged to avoid bias, remove vested interests and set aside our personal priorities and prejudices. This approach is not dissimilar to Luke’s maxim “do unto others as you would have them do unto you”, which Blackburn10 contends is the basis of almost every ethical tradition.

Sen, meanwhile, appeals to an arrangement-focused view of fairness where justice systems are universally applied without favour and where decision makers behave without corruption. Sen, an economist, also requires fairness to have regard for the economic efficiency of decisions and believes people should be involved in discussions on how economic efficiency is measured. He further proposes that justice as fairness must take account of peoples’ capability to access enjoyment of the things they have reason to value. This means that, institutional rules, while important, must be assessed in the broader context of the lives of the people involved.

Rawls and Sen thus propose a picture of fairness which has regard for the less fortunate, appeals to consistency, calculates economic efficiency and promotes people’s capacity to enjoy the things they have good reason to value. Sen also contends that people who are making distributive decisions should do so in ways which are open and accountable.

The ideals of Catholic Social Teaching11 strongly align with the fairness principles described by Rawls and Sen. Their understanding of fairness is much like the Catholic notion of the ‘intrinsic dignity of the person’, the idea that every human person is worthy of respect as a member of the human family. This notion grants each person inalienable rights; political, legal, social, and economic. Under the Catholic principle of ‘participation’ all people have a right and a duty to participate in society, seeking the wellbeing of all, especially the poor and vulnerable. The notion of the ‘common good’ asserts unfettered rights for all but not at the expense of others, but nor are individual rights to be subordinated to the needs of the group. The Catholic tradition also highlights the physical needs of the poor and vulnerable as a primary priority – the ‘preferential option for the poor’.

There is no one moral description of justice as fairness to which we universally agree, although the maxim ‘do unto others…” does underpin many moral and ethical traditions.

Still, the question arises: ‘how do we know if we are being fair?’ Is it possible to condense Rawls and Sen’s theory of justice as fairness into a framework of thinking to guide us? I propose here four questions distilled from the theories of Rawls and Sen. Imagine a situation (such as the plight of homeless people living in cars) where a decision needs to be made about fairness towards an individual person.

  1. Would the most advantaged person in society accept the decision about fairness, if at an instant, they found themselves to be the most disadvantaged person and required the decision to be made in favour of themselves?
  2. Has the decision about fairness been made in a manner which is open and accountable to all?
  3. Is this decision about fairness based on economic efficiency and on procedural fairness in defining what is meant by efficiency?
  4. Is this decision about fairness based on information available to decision makers about the capability of the person to do the things he/she has good reason to value in their lives?

Using these questions to analyse fairness in the widest context, we are guided to:

Conclusion

Fairness is a moveable target which reflects different sets of religious, philosophical and political beliefs. There is no one moral description of justice as fairness to which we universally agree, although the maxim ‘do unto others…” does underpin many moral and ethical traditions.

I have proposed in this article a set of questions which can be used to decide if we are acting fairly based on the justice as fairness principles espoused by Rawls and Sen. I have noted that these principles align with Catholic moral teaching. I have discussed various secular approaches to justice and fairness while arguing that these don’t fully encompass the Christian perspective.

Fairness is a complex business and many authors have tried to provide moral, ethical and legal lessons to guide us. Jesus has provided a lesson on fairness in the parable of the workers in the vineyard. His demonstration of love, mercy and grace for all the actors in the story is a most powerful demonstration of justice as fairness.


Dr Greg Coyle completed a doctoral thesis in 2011 examining how government funded public health agencies distribute health resources to citizens. He is employed by The New Zealand Salvation Army as Principal Advisor to the Social Programme.

Endnotes
1 Gauld, R. (2004). Health Care Rationing Policy in New Zealand: Development and Lessons. Social Policy and Society, 3(03), 235-242. Accessed on 18 July 2013.
2 Romano, C. (2009). Amartya Sen shakes Up Justice Theory The Chronicle Review, September 14, http://chronicle.com/article/Amartya-Sen-Up-Justice/48332/ Accessed on 21.09.2011.
3 Lamont, J (2007). Distributive Justice. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/ Accessed on 12.09.2009.
4 Russell, B. (1946) History of Western Philosophy, London: Routledge.
5 Gillon, R (2006) PHARMAC and the Funding of High Cost Medicines. Information from PHARMAC’s 2006 High Cost Medicines Review. http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/2009/06/08/Information Accessed on 13/5/2007.
6 Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2007). The problems of relative deprivation: Why some societies do better than others. Social Science and Medicine, 651965-1978. Doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2007.05.041
7 Hamilton, C. (2003). Growth Fetish. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. p124.
8 Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9 Sen, A. (2009). The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
10 Blackburn, S. (2001). Ethics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.101. ISBN 978-0-19-280442-6.
11 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. (2004). London: Burns & Oates. Chapter Four.