Issue Sixteen

John Kleinsman

In May of this year twenty-one American "Snowflakes" families appeared with President Bush accompanied by their adopted embryos. The purpose was to protest against a bill supporting the use of embryos for stem cell research.

Many of the babies wore T-shirts with the words "former embryo" or "this embryo was not discarded". The appearance of these children was a potent symbol of the fact that the embryo is just that child at an earlier stage of development. (Belluck, Pam. 2005)

The Snowflakes programme is a direct consequence of the existence of many thousands of frozen embryos no longer required for fertility treatment. While success rates for fertility clinics are improving all the time, and in some cases average as high as 35% for all women up to the age of 37 [1] , the relatively high chance of an embryo not implanting successfully makes it desirable for more than one egg to be fertilised. The "spare" embryos are frozen for later use. If a pregnancy is achieved, the stored embryos may or may not be required for further pregnancies. The question then arises as to what to do with them.

In New Zealand there are currently several thousand embryos existing in a frozen state.

Catholic teaching on the moral status of the embryo is clear from the time the ovum is fertilised, a life is begun which is the life of a new human being with his or her own growth (Evangelium Vitae), a being that will only grow in size and complexity. This implies that from the first moment of its existence the result of human procreation must be guaranteed the unconditional respect that is due to every human person. From this perspective the existence of so many stored embryos around the world represents a profound injustice.

There is an argument that the stored embryos should be made available for research that could lead to future therapeutic benefits for people suffering from serious diseases. This research inevitably destroys the embryo. While such research is clearly contrary to the Catholic position of unconditional respect for the embryo, it may be recognised as being, at least in some people's eyes, an attempt to give even limited meaning and value to a life that will perish anyway and that is seen as being otherwise meaningless.

Those who reject the use of embryos for research also recognise that keeping embryos indefinitely in the suspended frozen state constitutes an affront to their intrinsic dignity. (see Donum Vitae, I.6) In the face of such injustice, allowing frozen embryos to die has come to be seen by many as the most humane way of dealing with a problem that should never have arisen.

In 2004, following on from other countries, The National Ethics Committee on assisted Human Reproduction (NECAHR) sought submissions from New Zealanders as to whether or not they thought it acceptable for couples with surplus embryos to donate them to other couples or a single woman for the purpose of having a child. Depending on whether one is emphasising the perspective of the donor or the receiver, this practice has come to be known as either "embryo donation" or "embryo adoption". The term embryo adoption makes it clearer that the intended outcome is the birth of a child and, for this reason, is preferable given that embryos can also be "donated" for research.

Catholic Responses to Embryo Adoption
In the light of what Catholics believe about the moral status of the embryo, it would seem that embryo adoption for implantation represents a morally legitimate way of "rescuing" unwanted frozen embryos.

However, the Catholic position with regard to assisted human reproductive procedures is that their use is only acceptable between a husband and wife in very specific circumstances which assist the natural processes of reproduction, and which do not pose undue risks for the parent or child. This position undoubtedly rules out the use of third party gametes or embryos for the purposes of having a child, the very scenario at the heart of embryo adoption. Thus a number of Catholic moral theologians have described the adoption of embryos as immoral because, as well as separating the unitive and procreative aspects of reproduction (see Donum Vitae, II.4), it involves becoming pregnant by another man and is therefore a violation of marriage because it is like adultery, even though it is not as vicious because it is chosen for the good end of saving a child (Schudt, 2005, p.68).

Other Catholic moral theologians have reached a different conclusion. May, Grisez and others argue that embryo adoption rectifies an injustice that has already happened and which will otherwise result in the death of an embryo. The woman who adopts an embryo does not intend to separate the unitive and procreative aspects of the conjugal act nor does she intend to violate the bonds of marriage. Her intention is to save a child. (See Schudt, 2005, pp. 68-69)

The Right to Life
To date there has been no explicit pronouncement from The Holy See on embryo adoption. More specifically, comments from the Pontifical Academy of Life (2004) make it clear that it is premature to address this subject directly. Therefore without condoning the practice of IVF, it is reasonable to conclude that the adoption of frozen "surplus" embryos for implantation has not been ruled out.

It is arguable that the case for embryo adoption is stronger than arguments to the contrary. Many Church documents, such as Donum Vitae, stress the right of the embryo to life, and unconditional respect.

Thus the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to say from the moment the zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect that is morally due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality. The human being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that same moment his (sic) rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being to life. (Donum Vitae, I.1)

Donum Vitae goes even further, making clear that protection of the life of the embryo is the principle to which priority must be given in making decisions involving embryos:

This doctrinal reminder provides the fundamental criterion for the solution of the various problems posed by the development of the biomedical sciences in this field: since the embryo must be treated as a person, it must also be defended in its integrity, tended and cared for, to the extent possible, in the same way as any other human being as far as medical assistance is concerned.(Donum Vitae, I.1)

In the different Catholic approaches to embryo adoption, one argument gives priority to the sanctity of the marriage relationship, whereas the other gives priority to the life of the embryo. The passage from Donum Vitae (above) gives clear priority to the life of the embryo. Embryo adoption upholds the fundamental right to life of the embryo. Giving people the option to donate and adopt embryos left over from infertility treatment is in accord with the intrinsic dignity that belongs to such embryos. At the same time, adopting this position need not mean that one condones the way in which the human life was first brought into existence.

Embryo donation for adoption is morally more acceptable than donating for the purposes of destructive research, no matter what the intended outcome of this research. It is also morally more acceptable than the other alternatives; storing them until they reach a point when they will no longer be viable for successful implantation, or letting them die.

Practical Implications
To argue in favour of embryo donation for reproductive purposes is not to ignore the ethical and moral issues associated with assisted human reproduction. There are also complex psychological, social, moral, emotional and ethical considerations involved in embryo adoption.

One of the realities of embryo adoption is that it redefines the traditional relationship of a child and two parents, as well as having implications for the marriage. As noted above, this is the basis for the objections of some Catholic moral theologians to embryo adoption. We know from our experience of child adoption that there are issues relating to the welfare and fulfilment of the child as she or he grows and searches for meaning and identity.

In particular, it is vitally important for the overall well-being of the children to be born that they have access to knowledge about their lineage or genetic heritage. Where there is a conflict between the privacy rights of a donor and the rights of a resulting child to know its heritage, the rights of the child should prevail. The insistence on openness and access to information may also be seen as an appropriate expression of the principle that the donor parents retain a degree of moral responsibility, a responsibility that originates purely and simply from the fact that they are the genetic parents.

Assisted human reproductive technologies may also pose a certain risk in terms of the commodification of embryos and children. Any form of compensation for the right to implant an embryo would be ethically unacceptable. Even when compensation is considered unethical there still remains, as a result of the process of donation and adoption, an inherent risk of unwittingly conveying notions of 'ownership' of embryos.

The process around the "selection" of an embryo for adoption also has the potential to encourage a "consumer" approach to the birth of children, if adoptive parents are allowed to make choices based on certain arbitrary (culturally or personally determined) notions of "normality" or "excellence". It is therefore strongly desirable that donor couples be given the opportunity to choose the potential recipients of their embryos rather than vice-versa, and that the adopting parents are screened.

Some of the complexities associated with embryo adoption can be addressed by the provision of professional counselling and ethical guidance for all those involved in the process of donation and adoption.

There is also the need for a level of scrutiny, intervention and oversight by a neutral third party that is accountable to the government. This oversight has been described as an unnecessary "intrusion" into the private choices of adults. However, such oversight recognises the wide-ranging implications of embryo adoption - for the child to be born, the adoptive parent(s), the donating parent(s) and society as a whole.

Conclusion
Embryo adoption raises complex and serious ethical issues. There is no specific teaching on this matter. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that it is morally permissible. It gives the genetic parents an avenue for exercising their parental responsibility; an option that, unlike destroying the embryos (whether directly or through research) or allowing them to die, is consistent with the unconditional respect due to human life.

The obvious benefit is that a life already started is given the opportunity to flourish, to fulfil the potential it was created with, to experience the joys of living, and to become a significant person in a community of caring that is represented  in the first instance - by the parents wanting to adopt as well as those prepared to be donors.

Looked at like this, those who are prepared to undertake the challenge of adopting an embryo might even be regarded as acting in a morally heroic way.

References:

Pontifical Academy for Life. (2004). Final communique on 'the dignity of human procreation and reproductive technologies: anthropological and ethical aspects', from www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pont-acd_life_doc_20040316_x-gen-assembly-final_en.html

Schudt, K. (2005). What is chosen in the act of embryo adoption? The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 5(1), 63-71.

John Kleinsman teaches Moral Theology at the Wellington Catholic Education Centre and is also a part time researcher for The Nathaniel Centre

[1] Figures obtained from Fertility Associates - Te Rauhanga o te Wharetangata  website July 2005.

In the last few years while New Zealanders have been debating cloning and assisted human reproduction and the government has been legislating to deal with these issues, human embryo research has moved in new directions in other countries. 

Such research takes many forms. For example, in the USA scientists have created human embryos which were part male and part female, by implanting cells from male embryos into female embryos. The hybrid embryos developed normally in some cases, with intermixed male and female cells, and abnormally in others. The embryos were destroyed after six days of development. 

The search for stem cells
Much of the current research involving human embryos focuses on finding sources of embryonic stem cells potentially for use in medical treatments. In May 2005 Korean scientists created 31 human embryos by cloning and extracted stem cells from 11 of them, creating 11 new stem cell lines. These cell lines are almost identical genetically to the patients who supplied the DNA from skin cells, so in theory they can be used to treat the patients’ conditions with less chance of triggering a rejection response. The process used far fewer human eggs than previous attempts. The stem cells were grown on a human tissue medium rather than a mouse medium as used in the past, thus reducing the risk of contamination. These developments have overcome many of the technical difficulties involved in creating stem cells from cloned human embryos. 

Dr Woo Suk Hwang, leader of the Korean team, rejects the idea that the cells he creates by somatic nuclear transfer (cloning) are cloned human embryos, and therefore sees no ethical problem with destroying them to obtain stem cells. Researchers in the UK have also created cloned human embryos, although they have not been as successful as the Koreans in taking stem cells from them. 

In the USA Dr Leon Kass, chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics, said of these developments in embryo research and cloning: “Whatever its technical merit, this research is morally troubling: it creates human embryos solely for research, makes it much easier to produce cloned babies, and exploits women as egg donors not for their benefit.”

In China cloning techniques have been used to create embryos which contain both human and rabbit DNA. Human skin cells were fused with rabbit eggs from New Zealand, resulting in a hybrid embryo. The vast majority of the DNA in each embryo was human, with a small amount of DNA (called mitochondrial DNA) being contributed by the rabbit egg.   The researchers are hoping that the hybrid embryos will be a new source of stem cells. It is not known if these embryos would develop into viable fetuses, although indications from other research indicate they would not.   Richard Doerflinger, of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, said he felt certain that the human-rabbit embryos were human enough to deserve protection. "I think because all the nuclear DNA is human," Doerflinger said, "we'd consider this an organism of the human species." 

Sidestepping the ethical issues
The ban on federal funding of embryonic stem cell research in the US has led to a number of proposals to avoid the ethical issues associated with the destructive use of embryos. 

Drs Donald Landry and Howard Zucker have proposed applying to embryos the principles which guide organ donation in adults. Up to 75% of frozen embryos may no longer be able to undergo cell division when thawed, as a result of biological accidents soon after fertilization. Researchers argue that because these embryos do not have the capacity for human life, they can be considered to be analogous to brain dead adults. Just as brain dead adults can have healthy functioning organs, so embryos which cannot develop any further may have some healthy normal cells. When removed from “dead” embryos, these cells still have the capacity to develop into stem cells.

In this proposal the time of the death of the embryo would be a crucial factor in the removal of stem cells. If the embryo dies in the first four days while each of its cells are totipotent, that is, i.e. capable of becoming an entire human being, then the stem cell removed is capable of developing into a human being and must be considered to be an embryo. If the embryo dies at a later point any stem cells removed would be pluripotent, that is could form all the tissues found in a human body but would not be able to organize into a human being. 

In March 2005, at a conference at Regina Apostolorum University in Rome, the Landry-Zucker method of obtaining stem cells was the subject of considerable discussion. While the participants had some sympathy for what Landry and Zucker were trying to do, there were also concerns.   The absence of cell division may not be a totally reliable indicator of death, and there is always the possibility that approving the use of dead embryos may encourage researchers to create embryos – or thaw them – simply to let them die so their stem cells can be removed. 

Also in the USA, a proposal by Dr William Hurlbut to produce human embryonic stem cells without creating an embryo, called “altered nuclear transfer”, is being debated. This method would involve turning off the genes in an adult skin cell which are crucial for the organizational processes in embryonic development. The DNA would then be removed from a human egg, and the altered skin cell would be placed in the egg and cell division stimulated. This process would normally result in a cloned human embryo. However, with the organizational genes turned off the cluster of dividing cells would not have the capacity to organize into a human fetus. It would produce a mass of cells, many of which would be stem cells. These cells could be extracted and their inactivated genes turned on again to make them normal stem cells. 

Hurlbut argues that because the entity lacks the ability to organize itself it is not a human life. Some ethicists support him, but make clear that the gene concerned must alter development from the very beginning, not after a period of normal development. Some see the process as a means of passing directly from an adult cell to pluripotent stem cells without forming a cloned human embryo. Others ask whether the result of altered nuclear transfer is actually a disabled embryo, which would raise profound moral questions about the technique. There are also questions about whether it is right to manipulate the human genome to get around a theological or ethical problem, especially as the technique proposed takes scientists into new and murkier ethical areas. Altering the human genome in a way which is destructive rather than for healing is also considered by some to be a morally indefensible means of reaching a good end. 

“Embryo biopsy” has also been proposed as a means of obtaining stem cells without destroying embryos. In this process a biopsy is performed on an embryo to remove a stem cell. It is assumed that the process will not harm the embryo, but it is by no means conclusive that this is the case. The timing of the biopsy is critical, because the stem cell must be pluripotent rather than totipotent if it is not to become another embryo when removed. Many ethicists reject this method of obtaining stem cells on the grounds that it is an invasive procedure which is not carried out for the benefit of the embryo from which the stem cell is taken. It would effectively expose the embryo to harm in order to benefit someone else. 

Some scientists have also been experimenting with parthenogenesis as a means of obtaining stem cells without creating embryos. This involves stimulating an egg to begin dividing as an embryo would, without fertilization by sperm. After ovulation an egg contains half the human chromosome complement, so various techniques are used to acquire eggs which have the full chromosome complement. Eggs can be artificially stimulated to replicate their chromosomes so they have the full number found in body cells or in an embryo. Egg cells taken from a women’s ovary before they mature can also be used, as they still contain the full human chromosome complement. These egg cells are biochemically tricked into beginning cell division as if they had been fertilized, and stem cells can be removed from them at the appropriate point. There is evidence that these eggs are not able to develop very far, so may not be able to develop into a fetus. There is no agreement about whether in fact these dividing eggs are embryos or not. There are also scientific questions about whether any stem cells will be too genetically flawed for use. 

Re-programming body cells so as to restore to them to pluripotency is another route to stem cells, but without the ethical difficulties associated with embryos. There are significant technical difficulties to be overcome but as long as the cells are restored only to pluripotency, not totipotency (which would raise questions about whether they were embryos) this method represents the least ethically problematic method of obtaining pluripotent stem cells. At the same time, research into adult stem cells is advancing rapidly, offering processes which are ethically sound and increasingly, technically feasible. 

Ethical Questions
There are some ethical questions which are generic to a number of these proposals. The most difficult issue is whether in fact the entities produced are simply masses of human tissue or whether researchers are actually creating disabled or defective human embryos. If the ability to organize itself is an essential distinguishing feature of an embryo, it is fair to ask whether the absence of this ability means that the entity is not an embryo. 

Many of these methods of conducting research on embryos also rely upon a supply of eggs. Obtaining eggs from women is not without pain and risk, and the commodification of eggs is already a fact in some countries. The exploitation of women has to be seen as an ethical consideration in its own right. There are serious questions about whether we should treat eggs and sperm – “the seeds of the next generation” – in this way. Many people are uneasy about deliberately creating entities from our own gametes and cells that may be less than human. 

The motivation for many of these types of research is to gain access to a plentiful supply of embryonic stem cells, or to find ways around ethical objections to the use of human embryos.   The scientific community has been divided in its response to such research, with many challenges being issued to those proposing or conducting the research. These developments also pose significant challenges for Catholic theologians and thinkers. 
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Anne Dickinson is Executive Officer of the New Zealand Catholic Bishops Conference.

©
2005

In 1984 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger gave an address entitled “Bishops, Theologians and Morality” to the Annual Bishops Workshop run by the National Catholic Bioethics Centre in the United States. 

When Cardinal Ratzinger became Pope Benedict XVI the National Catholic Bioethics Centre brought this address out of its archives and made it available on their website. The address is twenty years old, but it poses questions which still need answers, and provides insights which have not lost their relevance. 

In the address Cardinal Ratzinger was exploring the relationship between bishops and moral theologians, which he posed as a question: How can bishops work together with theologians, the bishops being charged with the transmission of the faith and the theologians being charged with the dialogue between the world of faith and the mind-set of the world at large? He set this question within the context of a larger question: What contribution can the Church make toward forging a balance between external progress and morality? What can she do, not just to keep herself in existence, but to open up once again the moral resources of humanity? 

While the question about bishops and theologians belongs to a small group of people in New Zealand, the question about the role of the Church in “forging a balance between external progress and morality” belongs to all Catholics.

In wider society there are sometimes claims that the Church should restrict its activity to the purely private sphere. These claims ignore the nature of democracy, which at its best, facilitates and even demands the contribution of all, individuals and groups, to shaping society. In New Zealand over the last decade more and more channels have been opened up for participation in decision-making through consultation and dialogue processes, often with a legislated requirement for these processes to take place. In some cases, the legislation specifically requires consultation on spiritual issues as well as ethical and cultural issues. In using these processes and the media, the Church and individual Catholics are simply exercising all the rights afforded by democracy. 

Cardinal Ratzinger clearly places morality in the public sphere by describing its relationship not just with the individual, but with the community: 

“Morality is not an abstract code of norms for behaviour, but it presupposes a community way of life within which morality itself is clarified and is able to be observed. Historically considered, morality does not belong to the area of subjectivity, but is guaranteed by the community and has a reference to the community. In the lifestyle of a community the experience of generations is stored up: experiences of things which can buildup a society or tear it down, how the happiness of an individual and the continuity of the community as a whole can be brought together in a balanced way and how that equilibrium can be maintained…A crisis in morality occurs in a community when new areas of knowledge emerge which the current life patterns cannot cope with, to the point that what up until then appeared as supportive and proven appears now as insufficient, or indeed as contradictory or as an obstacle to this new knowledge and reality. Then the question arises, how can the community find a new way of life which will once more make possible a common moral existence for life and for the world itself?” 

“New areas of knowledge” and the new possibilities offered by technology now pose challenges, not just for the community, but for the Church itself. The language used in a definition, to describe a concept or to express a norm, may suddenly become inadequate as technology exploits that language to create what appear to be ethical bypasses. For example, embryo adoption/donation and new forms of embryo research designed to get around ethical issues associated with the use of embryos increasingly challenge traditional definitions and concepts associated with marriage and with the beginning of life. One of the defining features of an embryo (and hence a human life) for Catholic ethicists has been the ability of the fertilized egg to organize itself to become a foetus and then a child. If the genes which allow an embryo to do this organizing are deliberately turned off in the process of creating it, is the result a disabled embryo or a disorganized mass of stem cells? 

Morality does not exist in isolation as “an abstract code of norms for behaviour” - it must be applied to reality. Understanding reality is vital, as Cardinal Ratzinger says: 

“Since conscience requires training, since tradition must be lived and must develop in times of change and since moral behaviour is a response to reality and therefore requires a knowledge of reality, for all these reasons the observation and study of reality as well as the traditions of moral thought are important. To put it another way, to seek a thorough knowledge of reality is a fundamental commandment of morality.” 

There is no doubt we need to understand the reality of new technologies, and that our Catholic “moral tools” must be able to meet the challenge they pose. But these realities interact with another reality, that of our own society. Do we understand the reality of our own society as far as morality is concerned, especially when it comes to engaging with society on moral issues?

For Christians, the various sources of revelation are a precious source of moral knowledge and guidance, but they often presuppose faith. As such, they can be an inappropriate means of engaging with those who do not share that faith. 

However, there are concepts and values in the Gospels that are widely shared in society, particularly those concerning our relationships and responsibilities to one another. They may be echoes of a Christian upbringing for some people, or tenets of Christianity which have been incorporated into our society’s mores because they are widely accepted. Understanding the degree to which this acceptance of Gospel values and natural law is reality in our society is part of understanding the realities of society itself. 

This year is the 40^th anniversary of Gaudium et Spes – the Church in the Modern World. The opening chapter is a powerful call for solidarity with the whole human family. This solidarity requires that we seek to understand as well as to be understood; that ‘nothing genuinely human fails to raise an echo’ in our hearts. We can narrow our understanding of   the realities of our society – including its Christian echoes – if we view it only through the lenses of stereotypes such as post-modern, post-Christian or ‘socially engineered’.   The process of moral exploration requires a threefold inquiry into our own Catholic moral tradition, new developments in science and technology, and the realities of our society. The issues are too important to build our understanding of one of these components on stereotypes.
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Anne Dickinson is Executive Officer of the New Zealand Catholic Bishops' Conference.

©
2005

In America, and now in New Zealand, an increasing number of strong and powerful “religious” voices are emerging in the political arena to debate the moral issues of our time. 

A number of these Christian voices employ an approach to morality that appeals strongly and at times exclusively to the authority of God in Scripture. 

Christian morality must ultimately be able to be grounded in the divinely revealed scriptures. If that were not so it could not claim to be Christian. However, when Christian arguments are presented as grounded only in the authority of scripture, Christians give the impression that the credibility of their teachings depends upon belief in God. Moral duty is then only able to be presented in terms of adhering to certain rules expounded by the Church and supported by scriptures. 

Such an approach emphasises faith at the expense of reason . In fact, it effectively pits faith against reason. The role of reason is reduced to the selection and correct application of divinely-revealed rules to various life situations. When Christians emphasise the need to rely totally on faith sources, there is then little or no common ground on which to dialogue with those who do not recognise the authority of the various Christian sources of revelation. 

In contrast to the way in which some Christians rely totally on faith based sources for decision making, others locate the origins of moral authority entirely within human experience and human reason. This latter approach originated with certain Greek philosophers who believed that reality was entirely in the “here and now” and that there were no eternal standards or rules set by the gods - or anyone else - to guide us. Ethics, they maintained, consists of making up one’s own mind. In contrast to faith based approaches, the decision making process depends and draws entirely on human reason. Reason is emphasised to the exclusion of faith. 

While adopting totally opposing stances with respect to the roles faith and reason play in decision making, it is important to note that these two approaches operate out of the same belief that faith and reason are essentially in opposition to, and therefore mutually exclusive of, each other. Neither of these approaches fits comfortably with a Catholic approach to moral decision making. 

The Catholic moral tradition emphasises that “faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of the truth” (John Paul II, 1998). This approach, grounded in the philosophical thinking of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, integrates both the transcendent and rational dimensions of our human nature: Aristotle believed that ultimate truth originates ‘from above’, but that people are able to perceive much of what is true through their own perceptions and judgements. Reason and faith are complementary. Reason is a source of moral authority alongside faith. 

In the Catholic tradition this moral authority accessible by reason is referred to as ‘the natural law written on the hearts of all men and women’, a term which draws upon St Paul’s letter to the Romans: “When gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves ... They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts.” (Rom 2:14-15). In the words of O’Neil and Black (2003, p.163) the natural law constitutes an “interior wisdom that will unfold itself” when we commit ourselves to reflection on human knowledge and experience. 

Most importantly, the moral authority accessible by reason constitutes common ground where meaningful dialogue on moral issues can take place between all human beings regardless of religious belief. Natural law represents a meeting place where we can engage in the search for truth with all seekers of the truth. 

The Development of Natural Law
It was the brilliant work of the great thirteenth century Dominican, Thomas Aquinas, that first allowed St Paul’s insight to become the foundation of a theological framework capable of supporting and shaping a distinctively Catholic approach to morality. 

Prior to Aquinas, the Christian view of the world tended to be pessimistic, emphasising the corruption of human nature and consequently the weakness and inadequacy of human powers, including human reason. The corruption of the world, including human death and suffering, it was postulated, was a consequence of human sinfulness in the face of temptation as testified in the story of the “The Fall” (Genesis ch. 3). While belief in the corruption of human nature may have helped medieval people to accept the hardships and miseries of their lives, the logical outcome of this way of thinking is an approach to morality in which there is little or no room for human involvement. In our own time, such a worldview still dominates the thinking of some Christians. Things are right or wrong simply because God (or the Church as God’s representative) says so. Because of the corruption of human nature, human reason cannot be trusted. Therefore, ethical standards can only be derived from outside of human nature.

Aquinas readily acknowledges that our human nature has been weakened as a result of our sinful condition and that we are therefore more prone to “deviating” from our deepest inclinations. In spite of that, however, and in opposition to earlier beliefs about the human condition, he argues that human nature has remained fundamentally intact and therefore we can still trust our human reason. Consequently, argued Aquinas, it remains possible for persons to discern key moral inclinations and determine key principles by a process of reason reflecting on human nature. 

Accepting this premise of Aquinas means we can postulate a Christian morality that draws on human nature. Now Christians need not rely solely on faith-based insights derived from claims that are grounded in revelation from a source that is “external” to themselves and inaccessible to “non-believers”. There can exist a strong positive rational basis for morality that goes hand in hand with, and is further illuminated and clarified by, the insights of revelation. Some of the implications of a Christian approach based on human nature are:

There is a resonance between human reason, human experience, our moral intuition and God’s purpose for humankind.

Christian values are eminently Christian because they are in the first place truly human values. Thus, Christian insights into morality confirm what is normatively human rather than originating a different morality.

The humanity of Jesus confirms fundamental human values rather than reconstituting human nature from a corrupt condition.

Natural law enables us to argue for the rightness of particular actions without exclusive recourse to religious insight or motivation.

Natural law validates human experience and knowledge as an authentic path to moral truth

The Church has an obligation to use the findings of the secular sciences as well as drawing on its own theological principles (see Gaudium et Spes n. 44). 

Adopting a “natural law” approach to morality means that the Catholic moral tradition can address its teaching to all people of goodwill with a confidence that it is highlighting human truths. The natural law tradition offers a specific pathway to knowing God, a pathway that is marked out by what some have referred to as the “footprints” of God’s love and providence imprinted in the beauty and integrity of creation. 

The Application of Natural Law
If moral decision making consisted of little more than persons conforming to the appropriate external authority then there would be only very limited space for the use of human reason in deciding what is right from wrong. A natural law approach saves us from this diminution of what is a God given and profoundly human attribute. 

Equally important, a natural law approach to morality also enables us to reject the notion that what is right and of value is merely a function of the private feelings and subjective wants of individuals, a position known as ‘moral relativism’. Human reason reflecting on human nature provides a definite, even if at times less than explicit, point of reference for moral decision making.

In essence, a moral framework based on natural law emphasises that there is a certain ‘given-ness’ about human nature and the world in which we live. Thus, ‘not everything is up for grabs’: being human demands specific ways of behaving. “Human acts have ‘built within them,’ one might say, a purpose, a goal, an end” (Dunn, 1998, p. 153). Hence, we can talk about actions as being directed towards some general goal, purpose or end. This explains the origins of the very Catholic theological notion that actions have meanings that are inbuilt or ‘intrinsic’. This, in turn, leads to a particular understanding of ‘human freedom’ as living in conformity with the deepest inclinations of our divinely-created human nature. Thus we read, in Veritatis Splendor, that human freedom is not negated by obedience to the divine law; rather it is only through this obedience that it abides in the truth and conforms to human dignity (n.42). 

In the history of the Catholic tradition two interpretations of natural law have dominated. The first emphasises human physical and biological nature in determining morality. Those who follow this interpretation find God-given commands in the laws of nature. For them the moral project involves determining the natural ‘ends’ or functions of things and then acting accordingly. Nature is perceived in a relatively ‘static’ or closed way. This approach emphasises the order of nature over the order of reason. Its strength is the way it recognises that human effort must take seriously and co-operate with human existence in promoting the well-being of human life. “Part of being human is to have a body whose structure and functions cannot be arbitrarily treated” (Gula, 1989, p. 233). In other words, the ‘given-ness’ of human nature is clearly recognised within this interpretation. 

While it offers clarity, however, the weakness of the first interpretation is a tendency towards rigidity in its interpretation of human action. A narrow focus on the ‘goal’ or ‘ends’ of an action can result in a neglect of the ‘circumstances’ and ‘means’ together with its true impact on human relationships. It can also mistake the ‘givens’ of human nature for the whole, or take the fixed character of human existence as closed and beyond the control of human creative development (Gula, 1982, p. 39). The extreme of this view is often termed ‘physicalism’, because it unduly emphasises the physical aspects of human nature when determining what is right and wrong, to the neglect of other dimensions of the human person. A strongly physicalist approach has little or no room for the distinctively human, creative aspects of moral knowledge and freedom. It is both deterministic and reductionist. Morality is too easily reduced to discovering given patterns in the world, and human freedom reduced to abiding by or violating such patterns.

The second interpretation of natural law emphasises the order of reason over the order of nature. It recognises that our human nature is ‘invitation’ as well as ‘command’; that it is part of our human nature to creatively intervene. This interpretation reflects a more ‘dynamic’ and ‘open’ understanding of nature. What is moral involves reflection on the person “integrally and adequately considered”, to use a term often quoted by Catholic moral theologians in the post-Vatican II era. The person integrally and adequately considered is the person considered in their totality: physical, emotional, spiritual, mental and relational dimensions. Such an approach requires theology, including moral theology, to enter into dialogue and partnership with the physical and social sciences. 

The weakness associated with this view is that, taken to an extreme, it can tend towards a position referred to as ‘idealism’. Idealists evaluate the person and human action with little or no reference to the physical structure and functions of the human body or nature in general. The danger of totally disregarding the fixed aspects of human existence and the created order is that important ethical limits may be transgressed in the name of progress. 

Richard Gula comments on the distinctions between the two interpretations of natural law:

In a morality based on the order of reason, the human person is not subject to the God-given order of nature in the same way the animals are. The human person does not have to conform to natural patterns as a matter of fate … The natural order remains an important factor to consider if the human person is to base moral norms on reality. But the natural order is not to be taken as the moral order. The human person can creatively intervene in a reasonable way to direct the order of nature in a way that would be truly human. The ‘nature’ which reason explores is no longer separated from the total complexity of personal, human reality. (1982, p. 44) 

In an age where technological achievements have brought an increased ability to manipulate and shape the world in which we live, some question whether this second interpretation of natural law is perhaps too optimistic in its understanding of human nature, and therefore potentially able to contribute to a growing indulgence in, and blind obsession with, technology. Human confidence in the power and promises of technology, they rightly say, must always be tempered by a humility which recognises that we do not always choose what is good, and that we do not have absolute control. 

In fact, understood and applied properly, the natural law approach acts as a deterrent to human arrogance through its insistence on the indelible connectedness that humans have with God, one another and the whole of creation. Reflection on this connection calls us beyond ourselves, beyond human self-absorption to a broader consideration of what is good and its consequent responsibilities. This includes the need to live within limits that will protect and enhance integrity and harmony in all our relationships. 

Commenting on the way in which natural law operates, Gerard S. Sloyan (1990, pp. 58-59) writes: “The natural law has sometimes wrongly been proposed as indicating how people must choose in facing quite specific moral dilemmas ... a certitude is assumed concerning the natural law that can only be provided by a long and deep reflection on the implications of the teachings of Jesus and the apostolic age.” What this means, in terms of the Catholic-Christian moral tradition, is that natural law functions more as an approach to discovering moral value than as a body of established and specific content. One of the consequences of embracing a more dynamic understanding of ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ is that it does become more difficult to ‘know’ exactly what the natural law proposes. 

From a Catholic-Christian perspective the natural law approach may be seen as a “source” of God’s revelation alongside of the Scriptures. O’Neil and Black (2003, p.161) note that Natural Law and the Scriptures are complementary modes of assessing God’s wisdom and plan for human beings. Both assist us by revealing the image of God, as well as how we are to “touch and live out our God-given inclinations towards what is good” (p. 162). In particular, because of sin, human reason has to struggle to gain moral knowledge. The Scriptures are valuable in revealing in written form what is unwritten, and sometimes difficult to decipher, in our hearts. 

Conclusion
In this time when religious voices are reasserting the contribution of the Christian tradition to ethical debates about bioethics, there is the very real danger of increased polarisation between Christians and others. The Catholic natural law tradition provides a way of bringing together the religious and secular voices in so far as it offers a common ground for dialogue and debate. 

Recognition of the natural law means that the Catholic-Christian moral tradition can address its teaching to all people of goodwill, and can argue for the rightness or wrongness of particular actions, without having to appeal exclusively to divine revelation or religious authority. The natural law is ‘written in the heart’ of every person, since it is none other than human reason itself which commands us to do good and counsels us not to sin (VS 44). The Catholic emphasis on natural law legitimises the use of human reasoning when Christians engage in political debates on key moral issues. It is also a statement about how Christians might approach such debates and the sort of language they might employ. 

Furthermore, the natural law approach functions to remind us that being human demands specific forms of conduct, and that ‘not everything is up for grabs’. By acknowledging our connectedness to all creation as part of God’s purposeful design, we are freed from the relentless pursuit of human achievement that obscures our other responsibilities. At a time when research is pushing the boundaries in new ways, the fundamental principles of a natural law approach highlight the nature and limits of human freedom as well as the broad scope of our relational-responsibilities. 

At the same time, the natural law tradition allows us to maintain a positive attitude towards human research and achievement based on a positive assessment of the goodness of humankind, its responsibility to exercise reason in the pursuit of well-being for the whole of creation, and its ability to arrive at what is right and wrong by way of reason reflecting on the “natural order”. 

Richard McBrien (1994, p.17) sums up the Catholic natural law approach well: “Catholicism is, first of all, a way of being human, then a way of being religious, and then a way of being Christian.” 

References
Dunn, E. (1998). What is theology? Foundational and moral. Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third Publications.

Gula, R. (1982). What are they saying about moral norms? Ramsey: Paulist Press.

Gula, R. (1989). Reason informed by faith. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

John Paul II. (1998). Fides et Ratio. Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls Publications.

McBrien, R. (1994). Catholicism. North Blackburn, Victoria: Collins Dove.

O'Neil, K., & Black, P. (2003). The natural law. In The essential moral handbook. Liguori: Liguori Publications.

Sloyan, G. S. (1990). Catholic morality revisited: Origins and contemporary challenges. Mystic: Twenty-Third Publications.
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John Kleinsman teaches Moral Theology at the Wellington Catholic Education Centre and is also a part time researcher for The Nathaniel Centre.

©
2005

The Environmental Risk Management Agency (ERMA) recently established an Ethics Advisory Panel to assist in dealing with ethical aspects of applications made to ERMA under the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO Act). 

An ethical framework for use by ERMA in considering applications has been drafted by the Ethics Advisory Panel, and published as the discussion paper “Consideration of Ethical Issues in HSNO Processes”. Public comment on the framework was sought by ERMA, with the deadline for submissions being 25 July 2005.

The framework is made up of three elements – ethical principles, procedural standards and operational processes. In making comment on the proposed framework, The Nathaniel Centre chose to focus on the ethical principles and to a lesser extent, on the procedural standards. 

Organisation of the Ethical Principles
The Ethical Principles in the framework are described as ‘fundamental principles’ and ‘derived principles’ (which flow from the fundamental principles). Two fundamental principles are named: respect for persons, and respect for the natural environment.

The principles listed as derived from respect for persons are: autonomy, co-operation, cultural identity/pluralism, human rights, human dignity, justice and equality, well-being and non-harm. The principles listed as derived from respect for the natural environment are: animal welfare, sustainability, and well-being/non-harm. 

In its comments on the Ethical Principles, The Nathaniel Centre noted that, while the draft framework draws on early versions of UNESCO’s Draft Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights, the drafting committee for this document has since moved away from distinguishing between fundamental and derived principles. This was done in order to avoid any suggestion of a hierarchy of principles. 

The Nathaniel Centre believes that the distinction between fundamental and derived principles should be removed from ERMA’s draft framework for the same reasons that it was dropped from the UNESCO document. Several principles may apply in making a decision in a particular situation, and the weight given to any one principle will vary according to the situation. Any ordering of the principles which implies a hierarchy among them will be misleading when the principles are applied. 

The drafters of the Universal Declaration also offered an alternative way of organizing the principles, in their explanation of how the principles are organized in later drafts of the UNESCO Draft Declaration:

“The declaration makes a distinction between (1) the principles directly related to human dignity such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, benefit and harm, autonomy, consent and confidentiality; (2) the principles concerning the relationships between human beings such as solidarity, cooperation, social responsibility, equity,   justice,   cultural diversity; and (3) the principles governing the relationship between human beings and other forms of life and the biosphere, such as responsibility towards the biosphere. The order of principles in the declaration therefore follows a particular rationale and endures a systemic approach. The rationale followed in the draft declaration is to present principles in the following way: they determine gradually widening obligations and responsibilities in relation to the individual human being itself; to another human being; to human communities; to humankind as a whole; and towards all living beings and their environment.” [1] 

The Nathaniel Centre recommended that ERMA also adopt this organization of the principles. Because this approach is based on relationships, it provides insight into the inter-connectedness that is integral to the cultural, spiritual and ethical aspects of biotechnology. It also highlights the “gradually widening obligations and responsibilities” of human beings in relation to self, others and the environment. 

The recognition of relationship as the basis for the organization of principles enunciated by the UNESCO committee in its later drafts is similar to that articulated by Pope John Paul II and the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I in their “Common Declaration on Environmental Ethics”, signed in Venice in 2002 (sometimes called the Venice Declaration): 

“A new approach and a new culture are needed, based on the centrality of the human person within creation and inspired by environmentally ethical behavior stemming from our triple relationship to God, to self and to creation. Such an ethics fosters interdependence and stresses the principles of universal solidarity, social justice and responsibility, in order to promote a true culture of life.” [2] 

Relationship, with its sense of responsibility and obligation, is a more comprehensive and dynamic basis for the framework than simply “respect for persons” and “respect for the environment”. Respect does not necessarily imply responsibility or obligation. 

Human Dignity 
In its submission The Nathaniel Centre pointed out that ‘human dignity’ is not a derived principle. Respect for persons flows from human dignity, rather than human dignity being derived from respect for persons. The inherent dignity of the human person is the starting point for a moral vision for society, and the foundation for all Catholic social teaching. 

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is also based on this approach, as stated in its preamble:  

“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world…”

Respect is only one aspect of the response which human dignity demands, as the Universal Declaration makes clear. The Centre strongly recommended that “respect for persons” be replaced with the principle of human dignity.

Ministerial call-in
In ERMA’s discussion paper there is reference to the framework being used to provide alerts to a possible need for Ministerial call-in of an application. Section 68 (1)(a) of the HSNO Act states the effects that might indicate the need for Ministerial call-in:

“…if the Minister considers that the decision on the application will have (a) significant cultural, economic, environmental, ethical, health, international, or spiritual effects; …”

The Nathaniel Centre recommended that cultural, ethical and spiritual effects should all be covered equally by the framework if it is to be an adequate tool for providing alerts for ministerial call-in in these areas. 

The Royal Commission on Genetic Modification identified ethical, cultural and spiritual factors as all being important to New Zealanders in making decisions about biotechnology. The HSNO Act refers to all three aspects. 

In the draft framework ‘cultural’ appears as a ‘derived’ principle under the major heading “Ethical Principles”, which significantly reduces the status of cultural effects in the framework. Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao (ERMA’s Māori advisory committee) has a prominent place in addressing Māori cultural issues, but Pakeha New Zealanders (and other ethnic groups in New Zealand) also have a culture. There are perceptions in the community that, for ERMA, culture means Māori culture, and that most other New Zealanders identify with the western scientific culture. The framework as drafted will do little to change that perception.

Non-Māori have an equal right to have their cultural issues adequately addressed within ERMA’s processes in a way which gives them some status. In this respect, the UNESCO committee’s organization of the principles according to “gradually widening obligations and responsibilities in relation to the individual human being itself; to another human being; to human communities; to humankind as a whole; and towards all living beings and their environment”, provides a better template for addressing non-Māori cultural issues than does the draft framework. 

There is no mention of spiritual factors or effects in the framework. The Centre acknowledges that ‘spiritual effects’ are difficult to define for many people and are not confined to the viewpoints of various religions. However ‘spiritual effects’ are included in Section 68 of the HSNO Act and unless ERMA intends instituting a separate framework to identify them, they will need to be part of this framework if it is to operate as a tool for identifying possible Ministerial call-ins. 

The draft framework appears to be constructed primarily to ensure that ERMA acts in an ethical manner when making decisions. It is essentially an organizational Code of Ethics. As such, The Nathaniel Centre considers that it is not adequate for identifying and weighing the ethical, cultural and spiritual aspects of proposals put before ERMA. In this respect it does not do what Chairperson Neil Walter says in the Foreword of the discussion paper, that is,   allow ERMA to understand “the ethical issues and implications of proposals: essentially, the values and beliefs that people hold about the consequences of new organisms and hazardous substances…’ ”. 

Procedural standards 
The procedural standards set out in the discussion paper relate to the ethical dimensions of the processes that ERMA uses to make decisions. The procedural standards listed are: honesty and integrity, transparency and openness, scientific and rational methods, community and expert consultation, fair decision-making processes.

‘Scientific and rational methods’ is an inappropriate procedural standard to apply to cultural and spiritual issues in particular. They are by their nature outside any scientific analysis, and what is “rational” in one world view may not be so in another. 

The Nathaniel Centre asked for the removal of ‘scientific and rational methods’ from the procedural standards. If ERMA is to take adequate account of “the values and beliefs that people hold”, then ‘scientific and rational methods’ should only apply to the assessment of scientific and risk factors.

An alternative approach
The Nathaniel Centre urged ERMA to revisit the fundamental purpose and structure of the framework. It has to be a tool for identifying and evaluating the significance of ethical, cultural and spiritual aspects of proposals put before ERMA. As such, it must identify the cultural, ethical and spiritual values and principles that matter to New Zealanders, and build the framework and its processes on these.

The discussion paper notes that there are “no readily available models of relevant ethical frameworks on which ERMA New Zealand can draw”. This is an opportunity, not a deficiency. ERMA has the opportunity to create a framework which is uniquely ours. The HSNO Act, the report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, the Bioethics Council’s report on Human Genes and Other Organisms all contain material which could be used to construct a framework which is tailored to the ethical, cultural and spiritual values and principles espoused by New Zealanders. 

In constructing a specifically New Zealand framework it would be possible to take a matrix approach, with ethical, cultural and spiritual aspects considered in each of the areas of “gradually widening obligations and responsibilities”; namely, human dignity, the relationships between human beings, and the relationship between human beings and other forms of life and the biosphere. The Nathaniel Centre strongly recommended that the drafters consider such an approach. 
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[1] Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics. (April and June 2005). Explanatory Memorandum on the Elaboration of the Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics

[2] Common Declaration of Pope John Paul II and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, Rome-Venice, 10 June 2002.

©
2005